

Phoenix

**The  
American  
Right  
Wing**

1969

**READINGS  
IN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR**

Edited by  
**ROBERT A. SCHOENBERGER**  
*The University of Michigan*

HOLT, RINEHART AND WINSTON, INC.  
NEW YORK CHICAGO SAN FRANCISCO ATLANTA DALLAS  
MONTREAL TORONTO LONDON SYDNEY

# Conservatism or Extremism: Goldwater Supporters in the 1964 Presidential Election

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The purpose of this study is to explore and describe the policy preferences, political activities, and social attitudes of persons in the electorate who gave early support to the candidacy of Senator Barry Goldwater in the 1964 national election. The character and degree of attitudinal and ideological constraint among their opinions, behaviors, and attitudes is viewed with an eye to the question: was Goldwater's candidacy supported by a social movement of an extremist, that is to say radical sort or, instead, was "Goldwaterism" a conservative political impulse? Furthermore, was there sufficient constraint among the beliefs of Goldwater's supporters to justifiably consider them ideologues in a political setting that has been shown to harbor few political animals of an ideological stripe. Finally, was "Goldwaterism" primarily an elite or a mass movement?

In his important book on the McCarthy period, Michael Rogin has pointed out the implications of these questions for the analysis of the supporters of the late Senator McCarthy.<sup>1</sup> Attacking the ex-radical pluralists' view of McCarthyism, which was in part based on their assumption of the equivalency of Populism, Progressivism, and McCarthyism as mass (that is, antidemocratic, and anti-institutional) social movements, Rogin accuses the former radicals of an elite bias—a bias which caused them to identify McCarthy with mass politics and to avoid consideration of institutional and elite support for his activities. It is unfortunately true that the same biases have already begun to color the interpretations of the causes of the nomination and analysis of the social support for Senator Goldwater. Writing in the *Saturday Review*, for example, the late Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., identified the appearance of Goldwater as a remanifestation of an "extremism" which pervaded the A.P.A., Know Nothing, Ku Klux Klan and the McCarthy "movements."<sup>2</sup> Much of the liberal and not-so-liberal commentary on Goldwater not only reinforced this picture of the backers of Senator Goldwater as "nuts," "cranks," "neo-Nazis," and the like, but also, in a less pejorative vein portrayed the senator and his supporters as "irresponsible." Responsibility was a catchword among political commentators in 1964;<sup>3</sup> and while the seeming lack of consistency (responsibility?) which governed the Republican candidate's conflicting pronouncements on foreign affairs and domestic policy should not be lost in consideration of the outcome of the election of 1964, it does not follow that the supposed irresponsibility of an aspiring decision-maker should be used as the single tool in the analysis of the persons who supported him.

Theodore H. White, author of *The Making of the President: 1964*, carried this style of analysis into the Republican party itself. White identifies the conflict in the party over the nomination as one between the "Eastern Establishment" on the one hand and the "Primitives" on the other. This differentiation, while convenient shorthand and far less disparaging in intent than the Schlesinger comparison, nevertheless points to the same general

<sup>1</sup> Michael P. Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967).

<sup>2</sup> Rogin, especially his first chapter, "Radicalism and the Rational Society: The Pluralist View," pp. 9-31.

<sup>3</sup> Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., "Extremism in American Politics," *Saturday Review* (November 27, 1965), pp. 21-25. See also Lionel Lokos, *Hysteria 1964: The Fear Campaign against Barry Goldwater* (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1967), for an interesting collection of articles in which Goldwater was described as a "fascist," "Nazi," "racist," and so on. Lokos' volume is a post-campaign, pro-Goldwater tract attempting to "set the record straight." Nevertheless, it is an interesting record of one important aspect of the 1964 campaign.

<sup>4</sup> Angus Campbell, "Interpreting the Presidential Victory" in Milton Cummings, Jr., *The National Election of 1964* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966), pp. 260-264.

conclusions that Rogin and others<sup>5</sup> have shown to be the conceptual downfall of the pluralists: the portrayal of American rightist politics as practiced primarily by unsocialized political actors lacking either the prerequisites or the stability to be trusted with political power and as representing segments of the society which are, by definition, anti-democratic. As we shall see in the following pages, there is evidence to suggest that Goldwater supporters are not advocates of mass politics, are highly socialized political actors, come from normally conservative sectors of the society, and hold social attitudes and policy preferences which may seem to many as irresponsible and ill-thought out but which are held, nevertheless, by persons with extraordinarily high levels of formal education and political involvement—conditions which even the most ideologically blinded commentator would have to admit are associated, in the United States at least, with political responsibility. The evidence suggests that Goldwater's supporters did not lack continuity in their political norms with the remainder of the American electorate. As we shall also see, there were very few persons in the mass public who favored Senator Goldwater's nomination; even among Republicans he was a fourth or fifth choice.

The organization of this study is fairly straightforward. First, there is a consideration of the demographic characteristics of Goldwater's supporters; second, an analysis of their opinions on the important domestic and foreign issues in the 1964 campaign—civil rights, American foreign policy, and social welfare. The third and most extensive section deals with the political activity, partisan preference and involvement, political information, ideological structure, and political efficacy of the Goldwater supporters.

The responses of Goldwater supporters to various items from the Survey Research Center's 1964 Election Studies are the data from which this analysis is drawn. This group of respondents is broken down into early (pre-convention) supporters of the senator and late (post-convention pre-election) backers of his candidacy. Comparisons are made among the pro-Goldwater group as a whole and its two subgroups and other groups of the electorate in 1964, including Johnson supporters and undecided voters. For the most part, the analysis considers the segments of the mass public who were, relatively speaking, politically involved and sophisticated to at least the extent that they had a vote intention and/or a candidate preference at the time the SRC conducted its pre-election survey, September through October, 1964.

As I have suggested, Goldwater's early supporters were drawn from relatively high socioeconomic strata. Among the early Goldwater supporters,

<sup>5</sup> Raymond E. Wolfinger and others, "America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology" in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 262-293 and Nelson W. Polsby, "Toward an Explanation of McCarthyism," *Political Studies* (October 1960), 250-271.

the percentage of college graduates, persons with incomes of \$10,000 or more per year, and those employed in professional and technical occupations, or who were self-employed businessmen or managers, was remarkably high. Slightly more than one quarter of the early supporters had a college education, half of them held professional or technical occupations or were self-employed businessmen, and more than a third had incomes above \$10,000. See Table 1.

TABLE 1  
Demographic Characteristic of Candidate Preference Groups<sup>a</sup>

CHARACTERISTICS	EARLY SUPPORTERS		LATE SUPPORTERS		JOHNSON SUPPORTERS		UNDECIDED OTHER		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>Region</i>										
East and Middle Atlantic	8	7.7	45	20.6	222	26.6	70	18.1	345	22.3
Midwest	32	30.4	76	34.7	267	31.9	109	28.2	484	31.3
South and Border	46	43.8	64	29.2	210	25.1	154	39.8	474	30.6
Mountain and Pacific	19	18.1	34	15.6	137	16.4	54	14.0	244	15.8
	105	100.0	219	100.0	836	100.0	387	100.0	1547	100.0
<i>Population</i>										
Central cities of 12 largest SMSA's	10	9.5	15	6.8	121	14.5	43	11.1	189	12.2
50,000 and over	18	17.1	41	18.7	162	19.4	85	22.0	306	19.8
10,000-49,999	15	14.3	38	17.4	155	18.5	78	20.2	286	18.5
2500-9999	33	31.4	56	25.6	151	18.1	74	19.1	314	20.3
Rural	29	27.6	69	31.5	247	29.5	107	27.6	452	29.2
	105	100.0	219	100.0	836	100.0	387	100.0	1547	100.0
<i>Sex</i>										
Male	60	57.1	98	44.7	374	44.7	159	41.1	691	44.7
Female	45	42.9	121	55.3	462	55.3	228	58.9	856	55.3
	105	100.0	219	100.0	836	100.0	387	100.0	1547	100.0
<i>Age</i>										
21-30	16	15.2	21	9.6	113	13.5	72	18.6	222	14.4
31-39	18	17.1	37	16.9	175	20.9	63	16.3	293	18.9
40-49	24	22.9	52	23.7	184	22.0	70	18.1	330	21.3
50-59	21	22.9	40	18.3	179	21.4	73	18.9	313	20.2
60 or older	26	24.8	69	31.5	184	22.0	109	28.2	388	25.1
	105	100.0	219	100.0	836	100.0	387	100.0	1546	100.0
<i>Race</i>										
White	105	100.0	218	100.0	721	86.5	332	87.8	1376	89.6
Negro	0	0	0	0	113	13.5	46	12.2	159	10.3
	105	100.0	218	100.0	834	100.0	378	100.0	1535	100.0
<i>Marital Status</i>										
Married	88	83.8	156	71.2	641	76.7	290	74.9	1175	76.0
Single	6	5.7	14	6.4	52	6.2	28	7.2	100	6.5
Divorced/separated	5	4.8	10	4.5	52	6.2	27	7.0	94	6.1
Widowed	6	5.7	39	17.8	91	10.9	42	10.9	178	11.5
	105	100.0	219	100.0	836	100.0	387	100.0	1547	100.0

TABLE 1 (cont'd)  
Demographic Characteristic of Candidate Preference Groups<sup>a</sup>

CHARACTERISTICS	EARLY SUPPORTERS		LATE SUPPORTERS		JOHNSON SUPPORTERS		UNDECIDED OTHER		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>Level of Formal Education</i>										
Grade school or some high school	24	22.9	67	30.6	378	45.4	218	56.9	687	44.6
High school graduate	16	15.2	53	24.2	189	22.7	72	18.8	330	21.4
Some college	38	36.2	69	31.5	190	22.8	53	13.8	350	22.7
College graduate	27	25.7	30	13.7	76	9.1	40	10.4	173	11.2
	105	100.0	219	100.0	833	100.0	383	100.0	1540	100.0
<i>Income:<sup>b</sup></i>										
0-3999	12	11.5	49	23.2	217	27.0	142	38.6	424	28.5
4000-6000	16	15.4	45	21.3	168	20.9	78	21.2	307	20.6
6000-7499	11	10.6	22	10.4	136	16.9	45	12.2	214	14.4
7500-9999	22	21.2	38	18.0	130	16.1	46	12.5	236	15.9
10,000-14,999	22	21.2	38	18.0	107	13.3	37	10.1	204	13.7
15,000 or more	17	16.3	19	9.0	47	5.8	12	3.3	103	6.9
	104	100.0	211	100.0	805	100.0	368	100.0	1488	100.0
<i>Occupation<sup>c</sup></i>										
<i>White-Collar:</i>										
Professional and Semiprofessional	12	11.7	26	11.9	77	9.4	33	8.7	148	9.7
Self-employed business, artisans, manufacturers	29	28.4	45	20.6	123	15.0	48	12.7	245	16.1
Clerical and sales, buyers, agents, brokers	21	20.6	24	11.0	84	10.2	29	7.7	158	10.4
Total White-Collar	62	60.8	95	43.6	284	34.6	110	29.1	551	36.3
<i>Blue-Collar:</i>										
Skilled and semiskilled	15	14.7	41	18.8	260	31.7	119	31.5	435	28.6
Unskilled, service, farm laborers	2	2.0	11	5.0	79	9.6	38	10.1	130	8.6
Protective service	1	1.0	4	1.8	17	2.1	6	1.6	28	1.8
Total blue-collar	18	17.6	56	25.7	356	43.4	163	43.1	593	39.0
Farm operators	2	2.0	18	8.3	38	4.6	17	4.5	75	4.9
Retired	17	16.7	35	16.1	101	12.3	55	14.6	208	13.7
Housewife	3	2.9	13	6.0	32	3.9	25	6.6	73	4.8
Unemployed	0	0	1	0.4	10	1.2	8	2.1	19	1.3
	102	100.0	218	100.0	821	100.0	378	100.0	1519	100.0

<sup>a</sup> This and other demographic tables are percentaged down rather than across.  
<sup>b</sup> Combined family—expected  
<sup>c</sup> Head of Household

As an inspection of this table shows, not only were Goldwater's early supporters disproportionately higher in educational, occupational, and income levels with respect to the population as a whole, but they were also an elite group among probable Republican voters. Since Republicans have generally higher levels of education and higher occupational status than either Democrats or the undecided voters, the findings of high-status bias among pro-Goldwater Republicans is interesting. The division in the Republican voting bloc was the reverse of that suggested by White: the relatively elite segment of the Republican party's mass base disproportionately supported the "primitive's" candidate. Of course, the data in Table 1 do not account for the probable shift of approximately 10 percent of normally loyal Republicans to the Johnson ticket. In any case, the rather high absolute level of social status possessed by the early pro-Goldwater group is still apparent; and while the effect of that shift may have been to remove persons of fairly high status from the group of later supporters of Senator Goldwater, it was not likely to be of sufficient size to obviate this finding.<sup>6</sup>

There were a few other important differences between early and late supporters of the senator. Regionally, Goldwater's early support was drawn heavily from the South and border states (43.8 percent) and West (18.1 percent) with very little support from the Middle Atlantic and Eastern states, (7.6 percent). The later supporters, in contrast, were more evenly distributed among the various regions of the country with 20.6 percent from the East and Middle Atlantic states, 34.7 percent from the Midwest, 29.2 percent from the South and border states and 15.6 percent from the West. These compare with the sample's distribution of 22.3 percent from the New England and Middle Atlantic states, 31.2 percent from the Midwest, 30.7 percent from the South and border states, and 15.8 percent from the Mountain and Pacific states.

There was a heavy over-representation of males in the group of early supporters: 57.1 percent of these respondents were males; only 44.7 percent of the later supporters and 44.7 percent of the sample as a whole was male. This distribution, probably an artifact of the high levels of political activity among Goldwater's early supporters, will be discussed in some detail in the final section of this essay. Table 1 gives the distribution of all the various groups in the analysis on these and a number of additional demographic characteristics; the concluding section of this essay will discuss the contents of this table in greater detail.

The age breakdowns, also reported in Table 1, show that the early pro-Goldwater group was *less likely* to have older (60 years or more) persons in it than the later pro-Goldwater group and more likely to have

<sup>6</sup>The question of defection rates is discussed in Campbell, "Presidential Victory," and is treated later in this discussion.

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relatively young members in the 21-30 age brackets. Between Johnson backers and all Goldwater supporters, however, there was an extreme difference in the percentage of older persons supporting either candidate. Goldwater, with 21 percent of the electorate supporting him, had 31 percent of the persons 60 years or older behind him. Put differently, only 10 percent of Johnson's supporters were 60 or older, almost 30 percent of Goldwater's backers came from this age cohort. There was not a single Negro in the sample who supported Goldwater either before or after his nomination.

#### CIVIL RIGHTS, PREJUDICE, AND THE SUPPORTERS OF SENATOR GOLDWATER

If a single overt issue of domestic policy in 1964 could be said to have been the crux of the conflict among Republican political elites, it was the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The conflict over this act and its implications for further extension of federal power into the area of civil rights for Negroes was followed by a series of riots in American cities in which the Negroes were police and Negroes. These issues, coupled with George Wallace's success in the Wisconsin and the Indiana primary elections, lent an impressive facade to the supposed power of "White Backlash." By the time of the Republican convention, there had been a clear split among liberal and conservative Republicans over the civil rights issue, drawn primarily along the dimension of federal intervention on behalf of the civil rights movement. While the following paragraphs do not form a comprehensive analysis of the racial and civil rights issues in 1964, they do at least suggest that there was, among Goldwater's early supporters, a distinct opposition to both federal intervention in the civil rights area and a fairly high level of approval of segregation and other anti-Negro attitudes and policy preferences.

Table 2, Parts A and B, presents the responses of the various groups to several questions dealing, first, with federal intervention in the civil rights area (Part A) and then with a series of questions which attempted to tap the electorate's feelings about the civil rights movement, segregation, and property rights.<sup>7</sup>

Table 2, Part A points to a fundamental division between Johnson and Goldwater supporters on the issue of federal intervention to establish equality of job opportunity and integrated schools. In each case, the response most hostile to such intervention was given by the early pro-

<sup>7</sup>The intercorrelations between these two types of questions were low, but they were rather strongly associated within their category. The correlation between the two items in Part A of the table was +.308; the mean correlation between these questions and the school integration items +.133.

TABLE 2

Part A: Government Action on Civil Rights<sup>a</sup>

	EQUAL JOB OPPORTUNITY				INTEGRATION OF SCHOOLS							
	For Intervention		Against Intervention		For Intervention		Against Intervention					
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%				
Early supporters	17	16.8	70	69.3	87	86.1	24	23.1	69	66.3	93	89.4
Later supporters	45	20.5	131	62.4	174	82.9	69	32.4	588	43.8	657	76.2
Johnson supporters	387	48.0	278	34.4	665	82.4	402	49.8	266	32.9	668	82.7
Undecided/other	160	50.3	134	42.1	294	92.4	149	47.2	140	44.3	289	91.5
Totals	607	45.6	613	46.1	1220	91.7	644	47.8	588	43.8	1232	91.6

TABLE 2

Part B: Responses to Civil Rights Movement, Segregation and Property Rights<sup>a</sup>

	SEGREGATION				CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT				PROPERTY RIGHTS: OPEN OCCUPANCY					
	Favor		Oppose		Mostly Violent		Mostly Peaceful		Favor		Oppose			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Early supporters	29	28.4	27	26.5	56	54.9	22	21.2	89	93.7	48	45.7	38	36.2
Later supporters	58	27.5	51	24.2	109	51.7	43	21.8	192	97.4	114	57.3	63	28.9
Johnson supporters	154	18.8	306	43.8	460	62.6	265	35.7	707	99.3	519	63.4	190	22.8
Undecided/other	104	27.9	101	27.1	205	55.0	220	57.9	309	81.3	202	52.8	109	28.5
Totals	345	22.9	485	32.2	330	55.1	878	64.7	419	30.9	1297	95.6	885	57.4

<sup>a</sup> Percentages are computed only for those responding to the question. Responses reported exclude "no interest" and include "other" categories of response to each question as part of the percentage base. Total columns refer to percentage of respondents replying to the question in the manner indicated in the table. Tables read from left to right.

## Civil Rights and Prejudice

Goldwater group—in the case of school integration they were 13 percentage points above the later group in opposition to federal intervention and 33 points above Johnson's early backers. The difference between the early and later group of supporters on the issue of federal intervention to insure equality of job opportunity was small, but again a gulf separated all Goldwater supporters from those backing Johnson and, it is interesting to note, from the electorate as a whole on both issues raised by the questions in Part A of Table 2.

The second part of this table reports the responses of the same groups to a series of questions on civil rights issues which were not at the same time related to the issue of federal power over traditional local matters. Here the difference between Goldwater supporters and the pro-Johnson group are in the same direction as they were in the first part of the table but are by no means so extreme. Nor (with one or two exceptions) do the early or late backers of the senator deviate so strikingly from the entire electorate as they did on the civil rights-federal power issues. Nevertheless, it seems clear that not only was there a strong reflection of the Republican elites' controversy over the issue of the role of the federal government in civil rights among Goldwater's supporters but also a distinct tendency on their part to favor racial segregation, oppose open occupancy, and perceive the civil rights movement as more often violent than peaceful. Part of this probably may be explained by the heavy representation of Southern (37 percent) and Border state (11.4 percent) respondents in the early pro-Goldwater group (see Table 1); but the differences between the early and late groups of supporters are fairly small and the later group had a slight underrepresentation of Southerners based on the distribution of the sample as a whole. (See Table 1.) Obviously, then, the critics of Goldwater who identified his campaign and its supporters as generally opposed to equal opportunity for Negroes were in part correct; but Goldwater, on the other hand, properly identified the overriding issue surrounding civil rights as one of federal power and intervention in local and state affairs, not simply racism or segregation.

Clearly, the responses to the questions reported in Table 2 do not necessarily imply that the pro-Goldwater groups were necessarily bigoted, prejudiced, or hate-mongering, no more than do the seemingly more liberal responses of the Johnson supporters to the same questions mean that these respondents were integrationist, fair-minded contributors to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Part of the difference between Johnson and Goldwater supporters is simply a matter of adherence to their perceived party or candidate position on the issues raised by the questions. But it is rather surprising that groups with such extraordinarily high levels of formal education as the pro-Goldwater supporters possessed would favor segregation to the degree they did and so often oppose the right of a Negro

to buy a house wherever he might choose to do so. Was prejudice a distinct characteristic of this group? There is some data that bears somewhat more directly on this point; let us examine it briefly.

Employing an evaluative measuring technique known as a "feeling thermometer," the Survey Research Center asked the respondents in the 1964 election studies to indicate the degree (on a scale of 100) of approval or disapproval of a number of ethnic groups and voluntary associations known to large segments of the mass public. While this scale gives great flexibility to the measurement of the intensity and direction of an opinion, it has been found to be a relatively unreliable indicator of attitudinal constraint except among persons with high levels of education; that is a high rating of, say, "liberals" may be coupled with an equally high rating of "conservatives." Among respondents with higher formal education, however, this tendency is attenuated, thus making the scale of some limited value for an analysis of the groups with which we are primarily concerned.

Two groups other than Negroes who have been traditional targets of prejudiced persons are Jews and Catholics. The feeling thermometer scores of the partisan segments on these two groups and on Negroes are reported in Table 3. And as a preliminary glance at this table shows, there appears to be a general pattern of antagonism towards Jews, Catholics, and Negroes on the part of the early pro-Goldwater group. They were twice as negative in their response to Jews as the sample as a whole, slightly more hostile in their responses to Catholics, and about one and one-half times as negative in their views of Negroes as was the entire sample. Of course, it is evidently the case that a small subset of this early pro-Goldwater group was responsible for this distribution of responses because of the fact that the early pro-Goldwater group also provided a very high percentage of persons with positive attitudes towards these groups. Nevertheless it is clear that there was a consistent and disproportionately high level of antagonism to these three minority groups by this subset of the early group which was not present in the responses of the group of later supporters. Thus it appears, although the issue is by no means a closed one,<sup>8</sup> that prejudice—defined as expressed "coldness" to minority groups—was higher (with one exception) among a larger proportion of the early supporters of Senator Goldwater than among any other of the groups isolated here for analysis, and substantially higher than for the electorate as a whole. Again in the case of the group of early supporters, this finding seems especially significant considering the exceptionally high educational and socioeconomic status of that group, conditions which normally are associated with low levels of racial and religious prejudice.

<sup>8</sup> Due largely to the issue of overrepresentation of southern respondents in the early group—a control of South/North on this variable would, in a sample of this size, reduce the *N* in the cells to the point where analysis would be fruitless, with a random distribution producing only ten cases per cell.

TABLE 3

Evaluation of Jews, Catholics, and Negroes<sup>a</sup>

	JEWS							
	Negative ≤ 49°		Neutral 50-59°		Positive > 59°		Total	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
Early supporters	19	18.4	27	26.2	58	56.6	104	100
Later supporters	18	8.5	82	38.5	113	53.1	213	100
Johnson supporters	67	8.2	307	37.4	447	54.4	821	100
Undecided/other	34	9.2	191	51.6	145	39.2	370	100
Sample	138	9.2	607	40.3	763	50.6	1508	100

  

	CATHOLICS							
	Negative ≤ 49°		Neutral 50-59°		Positive > 59°		Total	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
Early supporters	13	12.5	25	24.0	66	63.5	104	100
Later supporters	26	12.1	67	31.2	122	56.7	215	100
Johnson supporters	63	7.6	236	28.7	523	63.6	822	100
Undecided/other	40	10.8	152	41.2	177	48.0	369	100
Sample	142	9.4	480	31.8	888	58.8	1510	100

  

	NEGROES							
	Negative ≤ 49°		Neutral 50-59°		Positive > 59°		Total	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
Early supporters	24	23.1	21	20.2	59	56.7	104	100
Later supporters	36	16.7	52	24.2	127	59.1	215	100
Johnson supporters	97	11.9	211	25.8	510	62.3	818	100
Undecided/other	67	25.3	109	41.1	89	33.6	265	100
Sample	224	16.0	393	28.0	785	56.0	1402	100

<sup>a</sup> Table is read from left to right.

#### FOREIGN POLICY: MILITARISM, ANTICOMMUNISM AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

The issue of the questionable "responsibility" of Senator Goldwater was, as I suggested in the introduction, a very salient one for the American electorate in 1964. Campbell summarizes the different areas of the Senator's image at which the electorate directed its criticisms:

It has been pointed out that Mr. Goldwater was much more commonly spoken of unfavorably than favorably. While he was more often referred to as a man of integrity than Mr. Johnson, and less commonly as a "politician," in most other respects he suffered from the compari-



son. He was especially weak in the public assessment of his past record and experience. His speeches drew much more criticism than Johnson's. His policy positions, as they were seen by the public, drew an exceptional number of comments, most of them unfavorable. While Mr. Goldwater obviously had many ardent admirers, the total public reaction to his personal qualities, his campaign appearances, and the policies with which he was identified was on balance clearly negative.<sup>9</sup>

And no single policy area drew as much criticism as did the electorate's belief that Goldwater was a militarist. Of a total of 738 unfavorable references to Senator Goldwater's policy positions, 213 were directed at his "militarism," 177 at his stand on social security and only 81 at his opposition to civil rights. The remainder were distributed among the issues of his conservatism, opposition to Medicare, and a general disagreement with his policies.<sup>10</sup> Very clearly, then, militarism and, by extension, foreign policy concerns were strikingly influential in the electorate's relatively negative evaluation of Senator Goldwater. This perception is even more remarkable when one looks at the data on the same issue from the 1960 election study. There only 12 mentions of either candidate as being too militaristic occurred, four attributed to Nixon and eight to Kennedy.<sup>11</sup>

There is a rather broad range of policy preferences and beliefs to which the larger issue of Goldwater's supposed militarism might be presumed to be related. Among these are, of course, overt concern about war in general and specifically the then relatively low-key conflict in Vietnam. But in addition such issues as foreign aid, the perceived position of the United States in world affairs, strength of anti-Communist feelings and the respondents' views on negotiation and trade with Communist nations all appear to tap concerns which if not identical to a direct concern with militarism at least are related to each other along the dimension of the respondents' preference for either a relatively conciliatory, flexible foreign policy or a rigid, aggressive-isolationist posture on the part of his government.<sup>12</sup> There were a number of questions in the 1964 election study which explored these dimensions of opinion and attitude. Let us see to what extent the preferences and beliefs of Goldwater's supporters on these issues differed or concurred with those of the other members of the electorate in 1964.

Table 4 regarding American involvement and policy in Vietnam presents an interesting, seemingly asymmetrical, distribution of opinion on this question of foreign policy which has, of course, become the central issue of American politics in the years since these data were collected. While

<sup>9</sup> Campbell, "Presidential Victory," p. 263.

<sup>10</sup> Campbell, pp. 261-62.

<sup>11</sup> Campbell, p. 261.

<sup>12</sup> These dimensions of policy preference seem to be the major ones to which the electorate as a whole responds. See Angus Campbell and others, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 355-356.

TABLE 4  
Policy Preferences on the War in Vietnam

	INVOLVEMENT				Disapprove		Total	
	Approve N	%	Other N	%	N	%	N	%
Early supporters	45	59.2	1	1.3	30	39.5	76	100
Late supporters	74	51.7	4	2.8	65	45.5	143	100
Johnson supporters	329	66.1	5	1.0	164	32.9	498	100
Other	103	51.2	4	2.0	94	46.8	201	100
Totals	551	60.0	14	1.5	353	38.5	918	100

  

	SOLUTION FAVORED				Take Stronger Stand—Including Invasion		Total	
	Pull Out N	%	Retain Troops Try to End Fighting N	%	N	%	N	%
Early supporters	9	11.3	8	10.0	63	78.9	80	100
Late supporters	18	12.2	30	20.3	100	67.6	148	100
Johnson supporters	64	12.5	230	44.8	219	42.7	513	100
Other	34	18.3	84	45.2	68	36.6	186	100
Totals	125	13.5	352	37.9	450	48.5	927	100

undecided voters were most likely to disapprove of Americans' involvement in Vietnam, they were closely followed by both groups of Goldwater's supporters who were 14 and 7 percentage points respectively above the pro-Johnson group's level of disapproval on this question. On the other hand, the Goldwater groups differed markedly from the remainder of the electorate in the option they favored as a solution to America's presence in Vietnam: the early supporters of the senator favored "escalation," including the invasion of North Vietnam, by a factor of almost 2:1 over Johnson's partisans and the undecided voters. The later supporters of the senator were only slightly less aggressive in their choice of solutions.

It is somewhat ironical, given the immense growth of the conflict in Vietnam under Johnson's administration, that the majority (57.3 percent) of Johnson's supporters in 1964 favored either a maintenance of the conflict at its 1964 level or pulling out of Vietnam entirely; and furthermore that the undecided voters also favored these alternatives even more strongly. Vietnam was the issue in 1964 around which the electorate's fear of militarism was organized, and although the electorate as a whole was almost evenly divided (48.5 percent for escalation, 51.4 percent against it) on this issue, the broad thrust of the Johnson vote was anti-escalation.

Evidently the militaristic segments of the electorate—with respect to



the issue of Vietnam, anyway—were disproportionate in the ranks of Goldwater's early backers. But although there is no clear split between the early and the late group on this question, there was a difference of 11.3 percentage points between these two groups, indicating that the voters who stayed with Goldwater, even though preferring another candidate, were likely to differ in a somewhat less militaristic direction from his earlier supporters on the issue of prosecuting the war in Vietnam. However, this difference is small when compared with Johnson's supporters and the sample as a whole. Since this group of later supporters was made up largely of what might reasonably be termed the "party faithful" (42 percent identified themselves as "strong Republicans" and an additional 38 percent said they were either not very strong or independent Republicans), the apparent militarism of Goldwater's campaign, while no doubt offending the defectors from the Republican ticket and Independents, and causing some concern among his later supporters, was not objectionable to the majority of Republicans in 1964. Evidently it would be a mistake to identify Goldwater's campaign as specifically responsible for the mobilization of militaristic sentiment among the electorate. It appears that, among Republicans, a large majority favored an aggressive policy in Vietnam and would do so regardless of who was heading the Republican ticket. Of course, this may simply be an artifact of Republicans' loyalty to their perception of the policy position of their party's candidate. As we shall see in the following paragraphs, despite the relative similarity in the two pro-Goldwater groups along these two specific policy dimensions, they were widely divergent on another issue which might seem to be intimately related to the prosecution of a war against North Vietnam. This issue was anticommunism.

#### ANTICOMMUNISM

The American electorate is generally in favor of negotiations with Communist nations (84.3 percent favor this, only 11.4 percent oppose it)<sup>13</sup> but on several other issues appears to be somewhat less than willing to support policies which involve the United States more closely than at present with Communist nation-states. For example, almost 57 percent of the electorate stated that "farmers and businessmen should be forbidden to do business with Communist countries." And a large majority (74.9 percent) of those having an opinion on the issue opposed the admission of Red China to the United Nations. (However, only 11.5 percent felt that if Communist China were admitted, the United States should withdraw its membership in the U.N.) The support of the electorate for American intervention to remove Communist governments seems fairly strong: 39 percent favored doing "... something to get the Communist government

<sup>13</sup> All percentages are based on the number of persons responding.

out of Cuba," but almost a majority (48 percent) felt that it was "up to the Cuban people to handle their own affairs."

Aggressive, interventionist anticommunism as a strong theme of Goldwater's campaign and, as we would expect, his early supporters were most likely to echo this theme in their responses to questions concerning American foreign policy. In order to measure the general level of anticommunist feeling among the electorate an "Anti-Communism Index" (ACI) was constructed by intercorrelating three items dealing with American policy toward Communist nations, and then, after establishing that a sufficiently high relationship between them existed for the purposes of an index (mean inter-item correlation = +.422), the individual items were trichotomized into a 3-point scale: 1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high, a 0 was recorded for missing data. To determine scores the sums of these values were added for the three items and the range of possible scores (0 - 9) was again trichotomized with total scores of 1, 2, or 3 becoming a 1 in the final scale, 4, 5, or 6 becoming 2's, and 7, 8, or 9 becoming 3's. The scores of the groups were then summed and expressed as percentages.<sup>14</sup>

Table 5 presents the distribution of scores for the various groups on

TABLE 5  
Scores of Groups on Anti-Communism Index (ACI)

	LOW		MEDIUM		HIGH		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Early supporters	10	10.6	33	35.1	51	54.3	94	100
Late supporters	40	21.4	87	46.5	60	32.1	187	100
Johnson supporters	267	38.5	330	47.6	96	13.9	693	100
Other supporters	117	41.6	125	44.5	39	13.9	281	100
Totals	434	34.6	575	45.8	246	19.6	1255	100

the ACI. Looking at the high end of the distribution reveals extremely large differences between every group with a candidate preference. The early Goldwater backers were more than 20 percentage points above the later group on this index, and Johnson supporters were slightly more than 20 percentage points below the later Goldwater group.

Anticommunism was not by any means an issue uniting all of the eventual supporters of Goldwater in 1964, but it was one of the stronger discriminators between the blocs of Johnson and Goldwater supporters. But while

<sup>14</sup> This same procedure was used to develop all additional indices reported here. The questions making up this index were those concerning trade with Communist nations, military policy in Vietnam, and admission of Red China to the U.N.

the conception (evidenced by some critics) of the Republican party and its supporters in 1964 as monolithically anticommunist is simply not borne out here, this is not to say that anticommunism as a political style was unimportant in Republican politics at the mass level. Goldwater supporters, while at the time accounting for only about 21 percent of the electorate, contributed 45 percent of all the individuals scoring at the high end of the ACI. And inasmuch as the groups isolated here for analysis occupy a relatively elite political status, the extreme differences found here between Johnson and Goldwater supporters, like the similarly strong division between these groups on civil rights issues, suggests, as we would expect, that these issues are ideologically distinct ones for these groups in a very general sense of that term. Intense anticommunism—a Goldwater campaign theme—was very well received by the majority of his early supporters.

Table 6 presents data about three additional areas of foreign policy on which some interesting differences are found between the groups. Like the ACI scores for the early Goldwater, late Goldwater, and Johnson groups the patterns of response on the first two issues in the table (success in foreign relations and world position) are rather widely divergent from each other. Clearly, Goldwater's early supporters were extraordinarily agitated about these issues, and those who supported him soon after his nomination also appear very disturbed. That dissatisfaction was so high among Goldwater supporters may, of course, simply reflect their allegiance to the Republican party's position on foreign affairs, or it may reflect a genuine concern for the state of U.S.-foreign relations. If this is the case, these respondents might be expected to take something other than a traditional isolationist position on the question of foreign aid and, as can be readily seen, they do.

As column 3 of Table 6 indicates, both the early and late group of Goldwater backers supported foreign aid about half the time. Johnson's partisans backed it in two-thirds of the cases. But the spread between the

TABLE 6  
*Perception of America's World Position and View of Foreign Aid*

	U. S. NOT DOING AS WELL AS IT SHOULD IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS		U. S. POSITION IN THE WORLD HAS BECOME "LESS STRONG"		FAVOR GIVING AID TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES WHO NEED HELP	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Early	86	86.0	61	61.0	47	46.15
Late	117	59.4	81	41.8	102	49.0
Johnson	170	23.9	102	14.4	490	65.1
Other	105	40.5	78	25.2	180	54.1
Totals	478	37.75	322	24.5	819	58.7

early Goldwater group and the Johnson group is only nineteen percentage points—a spread that is relatively small when compared with the ACI scores or the responses to the "success" and "world position" questions. Thus, while a more traditional isolationism may be reflected in the tendency for Goldwater supporters to object more often to foreign aid than their Democratic counterparts (and also in their opposition to America's initial involvement in Vietnam), a relative consensus on the issue is at least implied by these data and its direction is clearly "internationalistic."

#### SOCIAL WELFARE

In the previous two sections of this study, I have pointed to two broad sets of variables which clearly differentiate Johnson supporters from Goldwater supporters. As we might have expected, among these groups there were some extraordinarily intense divisions of opinion over the issues of federal intervention in the civil rights struggle and in their expressed levels of hostility to communism. The final issue area to be examined—social welfare—is one that is, not surprisingly, equally polarized (see Table 7). And like the civil rights and foreign policy-militarism issue areas, there was some discontinuity between the early and late pro-Goldwater groups in the level of their support for these social welfare policies. For example, the later group of Goldwater supporters was 18 percentage points higher in approval of Medicare, 10 points higher in aid to employment, and 9 points higher in approval of aid to education than the early pro-Goldwater group. But again these differences are relatively small when compared with those found when comparing the responses of both sets of Goldwater's supporters to those of either Johnson's backers or the undecided voters. Typically, spreads of 30 and 40 percentage points are the result of such comparisons.

From the three areas of American national and foreign policy that have been examined here, it is evident that some unusually large differences of opinion existed between the relatively politicized segments of the electorate in 1964. Also, and certainly of greater interest, is the fact that the early and later pro-Goldwater groups were often significantly divided on these questions, the later group manifesting a distinctly liberal bent in its preferences. This consistent discrepancy between the direction and intensity of the attitudes and opinions of these two groups is, of course, a finding which only confirms our commonsense judgments.

The evidence suggests that Goldwater's candidacy resulted in a substantial shift of voters from the Republican to the Democratic party,<sup>15</sup> and the data reported here show that the "party faithful" who stayed with Goldwater by no means responded to the themes of his campaign in a con-

<sup>15</sup> Campbell, "Presidential Victory," pp. 279-281.

TABLE 7  
Social Welfare

	FAVOR MEDICARE		OPPOSE MEDICARE		FAVOR AID TO EMPLOYMENT		OPPOSE AID TO EMPLOYMENT		FAVOR AID TO SCHOOLS		OPPOSE AID TO SCHOOLS	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Early supporters	13	13.4	72	74.2	8	8.2	78	80.4	12	12.2	81	82.7
Late supporters	62	31.3	123	62.1	35	17.6	146	73.4	41	20.8	147	74.6
Johnson supporters	501	72.5	140	20.3	311	44.1	289	40.9	311	45.5	332	48.6
Undecided voters												
Totals	189	62.4	94	31.0	127	40.4	152	48.4	122	42.2	150	51.9
	765	59.3	429	33.3	481	36.6	665	50.5	486	38.4	710	56.0

*The Campaign of 1964*

sistently supportive way. It appears very likely that Goldwater not only got all the support he could expect from ideologically conservative Republicans, but also managed to attract a sizable segment of the electorate whose views, as a group, were rather less conservative than this pure and early group of his supporters. These groups made up respectively 7 percent and 14 percent of the electorate.

These divisions of opinion and candidate preferences among the American electorate inevitably led to a conclusion so obvious historically and in 1964, that it may not be worth stating except for the fact that the Republican party's decisions in 1963-1964 appear to have neglected its implications: There is not a sufficiently large corps of conservatives in the United States to place a conservative in the White House.

Perhaps, then, in the decisions that were made prior to the Republican convention of 1968, the Republican conservative elites expressed a clear understanding that the nomination of a candidate whose views appeared to be as divergent as did those of Goldwater from even those of their loyal party members, cannot succeed in a national election. While there was a segment of the electorate who mobilized themselves around Goldwater's candidacy, the major thrust of their activities and his campaign was to polarize the elite of the Republican party and to make more than obvious the fact that the levels of support for the policy positions favored by Goldwater and his followers were insignificant in comparison with the remainder of the American electorate who felt, on the whole, very differently about the issues that faced the American people in the election of 1964.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1964

If the level of political involvement in the 1964 Republican campaign seemed to many observers to be entirely out of proportion to the actual percentage of the electorate that supported the Republican candidate, it was because Goldwater's early supporters were by far the most active and involved segment of the electorate during 1964. They manifested a high sense of political efficacy and involvement, and even for persons of their rather high educational achievements, they possessed high levels of political information and high rates of exposure to the political process, the media, and the campaign.

For example, 70 percent of the early pro-Goldwater group fell at the high end of the SRC's index of political involvement, while the pro-Johnson group and the later pro-Goldwater group each had only about 40 percent of their members at this point or higher on the scale. As Converse, Clausen, and Miller point out in their article, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," the early pro-Goldwater segment of the electorate was not only involved in the sense of being concerned about the outcome of the

election and being very interested in the campaign—it was sufficiently active to produce, in absolute numbers, more pro-Goldwater letters sent to elites and the media than any other segment of the electorate who supported any other candidate.<sup>16</sup> And there is every reason to believe that this pre-convention activity was carried over with redoubled effort into the campaign itself.

Converse and his colleagues suggest that a portion of the rational basis (that is, the premise that Goldwater could win) of the Goldwater campaign may have rested upon this high level of activity on the part of Goldwater's early supporters and in particular on the high media visibility that their preferences presumably commanded by reason of their high rate of political letter writing.

But visibility in the national media was not the only probable reason for the misjudgment of support for Goldwater by Republican conservative elites. As the following discussion reveals, Goldwater, while very much a minority candidate, was able to field a greater number of involved and active supporters than was Johnson. Surely at least part of the decision as to Goldwater's probability of success was also influenced by the presence of this field of dedicated supporters. Certainly it must have seemed to many Republican elites that a Goldwater boom was not simply in the making but was already a fact of American political life in the summer and fall of 1964. And while the previous sections of this study demonstrate—as, of course, did the election itself—that there was a fatal discrepancy between the general ideological orientation of the early supporters of Goldwater and much of the remainder of the electorate, the scope of this discrepancy, if it was visible to the conservative Republican elites, was no doubt balanced by what they also knew to be true: many extraordinarily dedicated people supported Goldwater. Perhaps that was all he needed to win.

A simple measure of political activism was constructed in the same fashion as the ACI with seven items dealing with opinion leadership, attendance at political meetings, working for a party or candidate, and the like. The mean inter-item correlation for these seven variables was +.924. Table 8 presents the distribution on this index among the various groups using a control for high and low levels of political involvement.

As is evident from an inspection of this table, the early supporters of Senator Goldwater were much more likely than the other groups to have accompanied their involvement (that is, interest in and concern about outcome) in the campaign by actual political activity. Even where the involvement with the campaign was low, this group was extraordinarily active in politics. In the case of the high-involvement group, of course, the

<sup>16</sup> Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clausen, and Warren E. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 59, No. 2 (June 1965), 321-366.

TABLE 8  
Levels of Political Activity—Political Activity Index (PAI)  
Controlled for High and Low Levels of Political Involvement<sup>a</sup>

	HIGH POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT							
	Low Activity		Medium Activity		High Activity		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Early supporters	0	0	35	50.7	34	49.3	69	100
Later supporters	0	0	30	62.5	30	37.5	80	100
Johnson supporters	2	0.7	231	79.4	58	19.9	291	100
Other	0	0	48	77.4	14	22.6	62	100
Total	2	0.4	364	72.5	136	27.1	502	100

  

	LOW POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT							
	Low Activity		Medium Activity		High Activity		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Early supporters	1	3.6	17	60.7	10	35.7	28	100
Later supporters	11	8.9	99	80.5	13	10.6	123	100
Johnson supporters	41	8.2	434	87.1	23	4.6	498	100
Other	61	20.5	229	77.1	7	2.4	297	100
Total	114	12.1	779	82.3	53	5.6	946	100

<sup>a</sup> Respondents dichotomized on the basis of high and low scores on the SRC index of political involvement.

differences between the late and early supporters may simply be an artifact of their own preferences prior to the convention, with Goldwater partisans simply backing their man more strongly during the campaign, as would be expected in any factional situation. Yet while this effect may be present to some degree, the later supporters of the senator were still, regardless of the degree of their involvement in the campaign, much higher on the PAI than any other group except the initial backers of the Republican nominee.

While these findings are very much in line with what we know about Republicans and persons of high socioeconomic status as participants in the political arena—namely, that they are usually much more active than Democrats—it is interesting to note the much higher consistency that existed between high involvement and high activism among the early Goldwater group than among all others. As we have seen, 71 percent of this group scored at the high end of the involvement index and half of this subset fell at the high activity end of the PAI. Only 39 percent of the later Goldwater group manifested the same degree of involvement and only a little more than a third of them scored at the high end of the PAI. Johnson supporters,



How much the Republicans lost and how much the Democrats gained from the short-term influence of Goldwater's candidacy is an extremely complicated question,<sup>18</sup> and the answer suggested here is by no means definitive—first and foremost because this is not an analysis of voting as such. But some idea of the effects of his candidacy on the more politically involved segment of the electorate may be gained from brief consideration of the data in Table 9. Of all Johnson supporters, 12.9 percent identified themselves as Republicans of some type, the majority saying that they were "not very strong" Republicans. This amounts to about 11 percent of the subset of the sample with a partisan choice shifting to the Democratic ticket. Among the supporters of Goldwater (early and late), 17.1 percent volunteered a Democratic identification, or about 4 percent of the same partisan-choice subset. Proportionally speaking, therefore, Goldwater got slightly more Democratic support than he lost from Republicans; but in absolute terms, of course, his net loss to the Democrats was almost three times that of the gains he made by attracting conservative or dissident Democrats to his candidacy. And as Campbell has shown, the overall percentage of votes gained by the Democratic party in 1964 was several percentage points greater than could be accounted for by either sampling error or the normal net variation in the vote of something less than 6 percent.<sup>19</sup> Goldwater's nomination resulted in some sharp turnover among persons with high and moderately high levels of party identification; and, if this pattern of identification is retained in these strata of the electorate, it suggests that a first step in the realignment of American parties may be occurring. Based on the other data we have considered, the direction of this realignment is toward a greater polarization along the well-worn, but in this case useful, dimensions of liberalism and conservatism.<sup>20</sup>

#### THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF GOLDWATER'S SUPPORTERS: DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF "EXTREMISM"

In addition to the questions of the strength and nature of the partisan identification of the various groups that we have examined, there is another issue, raised loudly during the 1964 campaign, concerning the extent to which Goldwater's supporters were or were not socialized political actors. That is, to what degree did they overtly support and practice American-style democratic politics? Or were they, as charged by Richard Rovere, simply a group of infiltrators?<sup>21</sup> Part of this question resulted from the

<sup>18</sup> Campbell, "Presidential Victory," pp. 279-281.

<sup>19</sup> Campbell, "Presidential Victory," pp. 279-281.

<sup>20</sup> Campbell, "Presidential Victory," pp. 279-281.

<sup>21</sup> Richard Rovere, "American Letter," *Encounter*, 23 (October 1964) p. 49 in "Two Faces of Republican Leadership: Goldwater and Rockefeller Elites in California," by Edmond Costantini and Kenneth Craik (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, Institute of Governmental Affairs, 1967), mimeographed.

high number of new (and pro-Goldwater) delegates to the Republican Convention.<sup>22</sup>

Costantini and Craik, in a paper dealing with the political and psychological characteristics of the two competing California delegations (Goldwater and Rockefeller) to the convention, found, however, that the Goldwater delegation, from California at least, was new neither to politics nor to the Republican party. In fact, the Goldwater delegates' commitment to their party, in terms of holding county and state office, length of participation in party affairs, proportion of income contributed to the party, and attendance at national party conventions, was in every case greater and often twice as great as was that of the Rockefeller delegates. In part, of course, these findings are unique because of the nature of California's somewhat unusually polarized party system. But they nevertheless point out that at the elite level the Goldwater backers do not necessarily seem to have been "seditious insurgents" or antiparty grass roots anarchists. As we have seen at the mass level, the early backers of Goldwater expressed a relatively independent party identification and had a lower rate of party consistency in their voting history (45.2 percent stated they voted for "different parties" versus 34.0 percent of later supporters and 34.4 percent of Johnson's supporters). But at the same time the high PAI scores of these early pro-Goldwater respondents argue for a rather high level of political socialization on their part.

A somewhat tangential approach to answering the questions raised about the political socialization of Goldwater backers can be taken by looking at several different sets of variables. One of these concerns the degree of legitimacy that the various groups of respondents assign to American political institutions such as elections, the Congress, and political parties. Presumably, persons who see little effectiveness in these institutions (that is, think of them as being unrepresentative and unresponsive to the "will of the people"), also are likely to harbor doubts about their value. Of course, it is the nature of an opposition party to question the decisions of such institutions when they are controlled by the opposing party. But nonetheless, the rejection of these institutions, if common among Goldwater's early supporters, might be taken as some very tenuous confirmation of the argument put forth by Rovere and others that Goldwater's backers lacked a commitment to the democratic political order. Secondly, if Goldwater's supporters approve of "extremist" political organizations, such as the Ku Klux Klan and The John Birch Society (although these organizations are in no real sense comparable except in the mind of the American press), as they were so widely said to do, we might infer that the support of organizations like these is inconsistent with support for democratic norms. If some evidence could be found that Goldwater's partisans were backward-looking political dreamers, rejecting the present in favor of the idyllic past, it could

<sup>22</sup> Costantini and Craik, "Two Faces."

be argued that this view of political life was essentially "unrealistic" and dysfunctional. Finally, if his early supporters are dogmatic and inflexible in their approach to life, might they not also be dogmatic and inflexible in their political actions, thus violating democratic norm of compromise and respect for the opposition's point of view? The remainder of this essay will attempt to examine and perhaps answer these questions.

Let us look first at the electorate's perceptions of the legitimacy of the government and of American political institutions. A five-item series of questions in the post-election survey dealing with "different ideas people have about the government in Washington" was combined in an index of the type used earlier in the essay. Labeled the Legitimacy of Government Index (LGI), the distribution of responses to this index is reported in Table 10. The modal score on the LGI is the midpoint—very few respondents were willing to describe the government in perfectly rosy terms. Dissatisfaction, however, was much more common among Goldwater's early backers than the other groups. While this finding in itself is of somewhat dubious meaning, having the character of a more or less standard opposition response, it is paralleled by a similar pattern of responses to several

TABLE 10  
Distribution of Scores on  
Legitimacy of Government Index (LGI)<sup>a</sup>

	HIGH LEGITIMACY		MEDIUM LEGITIMACY		LOW LEGITIMACY	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Early supporters	1	1.0	38	39.2	58	59.8
Late supporters	9	4.4	95	46.8	99	48.8
Johnson supporters	26	3.3	557	70.7	205	26.0
Other supporters	20	5.6	219	61.9	115	32.5
Total	56	3.9	909	63.0	477	33.1

<sup>a</sup> The items were as follows:

1. Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked at all?
2. Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?
3. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time or only some of the time?
4. Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing, or do you think quite a few of them don't seem to know what they are doing?
5. Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

The mean inter-item correlation for these five questions is +.763

TABLE 11  
Legitimacy of Political Institutions

	GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PAY MUCH ATTENTION TO WHAT THE PEOPLE THINK WHEN IT DECIDES WHAT TO DO.		POLITICAL PARTIES DO NOT HELP MUCH TO MAKE THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVE TO THE PEOPLE.		ELECTIONS DO NOT HELP MUCH TO MAKE THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVE.		CONGRESSMEN DO NOT PAY MUCH ATTENTION TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS WHEN MAKING DECISIONS.	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Early supporters	42	43.7	18	19.1	10	10.3	20	20.8
Late supporters	60	30.6	33	17.4	20	10.2	35	17.8
Johnson supporters	146	19.7	79	10.7	28	3.7	102	13.6
Undecided voters and others	90	29.0	50	16.6	32	10.2	60	19.6
Total	338	25.2	180	13.6	90	6.6	217	16.1

questions concerning American political institutions. These responses were not reduced to an index but are presented individually in Table 11. In every case, the early supporters of Senator Goldwater gave a slightly greater proportion of responses questioning the effectiveness of the three agencies of representation (Congress, parties, and elections) and were 13 percentage points above the later supporters of the Senator in their overall belief in the unrepresentativeness of the government.

I do not believe that any but the most tentative conclusions may be drawn from these two patterns of responses; but it does seem reasonable to conclude that the early pro-Goldwater group does manifest a very slight tendency in the direction proposed by Rovere and others. They were, in fact, more often willing to give pessimistic and disaffected responses to questions concerning American political institutions and government than most of the mass public. Whether or not this pattern simply reflects their role as an opposition force or if it simply reflects a "realistic" attitude toward the facts of American political life is hard to say. In any case, the evidence does not support any particular interpretation very strongly, and there is most certainly no strong support here for an interpretation of Goldwater's followers as being generally alienated or hostile to the forms and institutions of American political life.



Another related issue, raised loudly during the 1964 Republican convention and the ensuing campaign, revolved around "extremism" or, more specifically, about the supposed "extremist" support for Goldwater and his supposed reciprocal encouragement of "extremist" groups. The most prominent of these was The John Birch Society, an organization with which Goldwater had cooperated while he was a senator although he later became critical of its founder, Robert Welch.<sup>23</sup> The measure of support for this organization employed in this survey was the "feeling thermometer" discussed above and the responses of the various groups to the Birch Society are reported in Table 12 along with data about the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade and the Ku Klux Klan, two other organizations often described as extremist.

As Table 12 clearly demonstrates, the two groups of Goldwater's sup-

TABLE 12\*

Support for Three "Extremist" Organizations:  
The John Birch Society, the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade,  
and the Ku Klux Klan

	J.B.S.		C.A.C.C.		K.K.K.	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Early supporters	43	47.3	16	41.0	4	4.2
Late supporters	35	19.9	19	31.1	12	6.0
Johnson supporters	36	5.8	56	28.7	24	3.2
Undecided voters and others	13	5.4	13	18.8	11	3.5
Total	127	11.3	104	28.6	41	3.0

\* Table should be read from left to right. It reports only the indicated percentage of the candidate preference group responding as stated in the table. Scores  $\geq 60^\circ$  on feeling thermometer.

porters were much more likely to give favorable evaluations of these groups than Johnson's backers or the undecided voters; and the early pro-Goldwater group was particularly strong in its support of The John Birch Society and the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade. In view of this high level of support for these two groups by Goldwater's early backers it may seem appropriate to answer our original question in the affirmative; that is to accept the notion that Goldwater's early supporters were "extremists." If we equate support for these groups with radical or "extremist" political values (a highly dubious assumption considering the fact that they tend to work

<sup>23</sup> Specifically, by signing, with Welch and a number of members of the Council of the Society, an advertisement urging Eisenhower to cancel a then impending visit to the U.S. by the former Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev. This advertisement was reprinted in *The Blue Book* of The John Birch Society.

within the system), there is no question that the early Goldwater supporters were disproportionately pro-"extremist." But as we have seen, this high level of approval of the Birch Society and the C.A.C.C. was not accompanied by any wholesale rejection of political institutions. This is not to say, however, that the three sets of findings presented here do not give some support to the Rovere thesis, they do. But with the exception of the data on the "extremist" groups, this support is not terribly strong.

The last measures which bear on this point are two attempts to assess the degree of personal dogmatism and of yearning for the past among the respondents—two sets of concepts which have frequently been associated with the psychological components of conservatism. The first of these, personal dogmatism, was tapped by three items reported in Table 13 concerning the respondents' ability to change his mind, his success in winning

TABLE 13

Personal Dogmatism (Self Reported)

	ALWAYS GETS "OWN WAY" IN ARGUMENTS		HAS STRONG OPINIONS		HARD TO CHANGE MIND	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Early supporters	22	23.9	72	74.2	81	84.4
Late supporters	43	21.9	94	46.5	145	72.5
Johnson supporters	197	25.5	347	44.5	546	69.5
Undecided voters and others	66	19.6	123	43.9	232	67.8
Total	328	23.4	636	44.9	1004	70.5

arguments, and the strength of his opinions. As can be seen, some interesting differences do emerge between the early pro-Goldwater group and the remainder of the electorate on the two items having to do with strength of opinion and flexibility in changing one's mind. Goldwater's early backers are about 30 percentage points above all of the other groups of respondents in their self reported characteristic of "having strong opinions" and about 15 points higher than the others in their reported resistance to changing their minds. A certain mental rigidity definitely appears, at first, to characterize this group vis-a-vis all other groups isolated here for analysis but, in fact, this finding is largely an artifact of the high level of education and political sophistication that is present among the early supporters of the Senator.

Somewhat surprising, however, is the data reported in Table 14, for contrary to much popular wisdom there was no universal identification of

TABLE 14  
*Nostalgia for the Past*

	STATE LIFE WAS BETTER 50 YEARS AGO		LIFE MORE SATISFYING 50 YEARS AGO		HARDER TO LEAD A GOOD MORAL LIFE NOW	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Early supporters	25	26.3	44	47.3	62	69.7
Late supporters	47	23.7	84	43.5	142	74.7
Johnson supporters	120	15.7	233	30.9	517	69.1
Undecided voters and others	77	23.3	119	36.4	234	73.4
Total	269	19.4	480	35.1	955	71.0

the past as personally or morally idyllic on the part of Goldwater's early or later supporters. Rather, only a slight tendency exists for the pro-Goldwater groups to value the past over the present—a finding that is somewhat confusing when one considers their profound dissatisfactions with the course of much current American foreign and domestic policy.

### CONCLUSION

The theoretically relevant conclusions that may be drawn from the data presented in this essay appear to fit quite well with the findings of Nelson W. Polsby in his re-analysis of survey data on support for McCarthy represented elsewhere in this volume and Raymond Wolfinger and his collaborators in their study of *The Christian Anti-Communism Crusade*.<sup>24</sup> Their work diverged from a tradition in political sociology which attributed the origins of "right-wing extremists" to social-structural discrepancy. This idea had a good deal of influence on Lipset, Bell, and Hofstadter, and has also strongly influenced two major pieces of empirical research on the "Radical Right" which were published as recently as 1966 and 1967,<sup>25</sup> one of which is also represented elsewhere in this volume.

While it is a highly questionable enterprise to equate Goldwater's early supporters with "right-wing extremists" and to proceed with an analysis of prior theory by determining the degree of fit between the statements of

<sup>24</sup> Raymond E. Wolfinger and others, "America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology," in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 262-293, and Polsby, "McCarthyism."

<sup>25</sup> See especially, Gary B. Rush, "Status Consistency and Right-Wing Extremism," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 32, No. 1 (February 1967), 86-92.

the theories and the behavior of these individuals, a brief review<sup>26</sup> of five separate areas of theoretical speculation about the origins of "right-wing extremist" groups may nevertheless serve as an appropriate conclusion to this essay.

A number of writers have proposed that right-wing "extremists" are "alienated." That is, they have suffered economic dislocation or some serious breakdown in primary group associations, lack secondary group memberships, and are detached from politics and political institutions.

We may say quite firmly that these are statements which do not generally apply to the early supporters of Senator Goldwater. In fact, the opposite seems the case. The early Goldwater group is highest in the proportion of its members who are married and second (to the later pro-Goldwater respondents) in the lowest proportion of divorced or separated members. They are also the most frequent church-goers in the population. Almost 62 percent of the early pro-Goldwater group had some college education or more and nearly 40 percent had incomes of \$10,000 or more per year. As we also know, their economic condition, as measured by a number of variables such as home ownership and their reports concerning the comparative cost of the neighborhoods into which they have moved, seems largely secure and comfortable. We have seen their very high level of participation in politics and their extraordinarily high sense of political efficacy and involvement. These are conditions which argue rather strongly against describing the early supporters of Senator Goldwater as alienated—at least in the meaning usually assigned to this term.

Although not covered in detail in the body of the essay, the issue of status discrepancy (that is, the presence of an imbalance in one or more components of socioeconomic status, such as very low income with very high education) will be examined at this point. As we just noted, high income and educational attainment mark Goldwater's early supporters. The same is true of their occupational roles. They are highest in the proportion of white-collar workers (by almost 20 percentage points) and correspondingly lowest in the percentage of blue-collar workers. They are especially high (28 percent) in the category of self-employed businessmen, artisans, and managers, a finding which parallels that of Martin Trow in his important study of small businessmen's support for McCarthy in Bennington, Vermont.<sup>27</sup>

As we shall see in the following pages, however, Goldwater's supporters,

<sup>26</sup> For further detail on these points consult James McEvoy III, "The American Right in the National Election of 1964," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968).

<sup>27</sup> Martin Trow, "Right-Wing Radicalism and Political Intolerance: A Study of Support for McCarthy in a New England Town," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1957).

while disproportionately sharing the economic roles Trow found to be associated with support for McCarthy, had quite a different orientation toward the major economic institutions of American society. In their social class identifications, the early pro-Goldwater group was overwhelmingly middle class (70.6 percent), 18 percentage points above their nearest rival, the later group of Goldwater supporters. It does not appear then, that there is very much status discrepancy at the group level among Goldwater's early supporters. Furthermore, upward intergenerational mobility appears to be no greater among the early pro-Goldwater respondents than among the later group or the Johnson supporters. Each group reports a gain of about 8 percent in middle-class status over the reported status of their parents.

Additionally, in a series of cross tabulations *within* the various groups between the variables of occupations, income, and education, no important differences were found between the early pro-Goldwater group and the other groups in the proportion of their members who were status discrepant. Table 15 gives the results of these tabulations. As this table indicates, the proportions of each of the candidate preference groups that falls into any of the discrepant conditions is rather small, having a maximum value of about 13 percentage points. And there is no consistent pattern of upward or downward discrepancy found here either. Put differently, the three discrepant conditions which imply upward social movement (a grade-school education paired with an income of \$10,000 or more; a grade-school education and an upper white-collar occupation, and a blue-collar occupation with an income of \$10,000 or more) are distributed about equally among all three of the candidate-preference groups as are the three remaining discrepant conditions implying downward social mobility.

Finally, Table 16 reports the proportion of respondents in the various groups that are mismatched in terms of their reported social class membership and their educational level. In the case of persons with a low (grade-school) level of education who report a middle class identification we might attribute such a report to *status anxiety*, a psychological variant of the status discrepancy theory which is manifested as anxiety about one's status irrespective of its actual consistency and has usually been measured by questions concerning one's acceptance in his local community. Table 16, while obviously not fully tapping this dimension of behavior, might be considered to reflect either actual upward or downward mobility which is correctly perceived by the respondent, or it could be taken as indicating a perverse self-aggrandizing or self-effacing tendency on the part of the respondents and as such be indicative of some sort of status anxiety. As can be seen from the table, the early pro-Goldwater group is slightly below the mean percentage of mismatched respondents. Thus, if this is a measure of status anxiety, it does not support the notion of status anxiety as causally related

TABLE 15  
Status Discrepancy—Comparison of Groups on Selected Status Variables: Occupation, Income, Educational Attainment<sup>a</sup>

	Grade School Education and Income $\geq$ \$10,000.00		Grade School Education and Upper White-Collar Occup.		Some College or More and Income $\geq$ \$6,000.00		Some College or More and Blue-Collar Occupation		Blue-Collar Occupation and Income $\geq$ \$10,000.00		Upper White-Collar Occup. and Income $\geq$ \$6,000.00	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Early supporters	3	2.9	7	7.1	11	10.6	8	8.1	3	3.1	7	7.1
Later supporters	7	3.5	7	3.4	28	13.5	16	7.8	13	7.5	13	6.6
Johnson supporters	44	5.5	44	5.6	86	10.7	74	9.4	42	5.5	40	5.2
Undecided voters and others	12	3.3	23	9.7	27	7.3	21	8.9	13	5.7	20	8.7
Mean %		3.8		6.5		10.5		8.6		5.5		6.9

<sup>a</sup> Table is to be read from left to right. Numbers and percents refer to proportion of candidate preference group matching the given condition of discrepancy.

TABLE 16<sup>a</sup>

*Status Anxiety: Comparison of Self-Reported Social Status with Level of Formal Education*

	MIDDLE CLASS ID GRADE SCHOOL		WORKING CLASS ID SOME COLLEGE OR MORE	
	N	%	N	%
Early supporters	9	9.9	6	6.6
Late supporters	23	11.3	22	10.8
Johnson supporters	70	8.7	106	13.1
Undecided voters and others	36	9.9	23	6.3
Mean %		10.0		9.2

<sup>a</sup> Table is to be read from left to right. Numbers and percentages refer to proportion of candidate preference group matching the given condition of discrepancy.

to political "extremism" if we accept support for Goldwater as in any sense being the equivalent of being an "extremist."

The thesis which equated support for McCarthy with populism, so well refuted by Michael Rogin in his recent volume on McCarthy, cannot really be tested as applicable to the Goldwater movement by the data we have here. But it is interesting to note that Goldwater got almost no early support in the New England states and very little in the Middle Atlantic area. He received disproportionate support from the southern and the border states and slightly disproportionate early backing in the West. Although there was no overrepresentation of rural respondents among the early Goldwater group, there was considerable (11 percentage points above the mean) overrepresentation of persons living in very small towns of 2500-9999 persons. Thus a slightly small-town southern caste to the group does exist but this, of course, is a far cry from being coextensive even with southern populism. Finally, the early Goldwater group was less likely than any of the others to have grown up on a farm and more likely to have come from larger cities of 250,000 or more.

Religious fundamentalism, a trait often associated with right-wing political extremism, was not found disproportionately among the early Goldwater group. In fact, they were lowest in the proportion of members in pietistic Protestant and neofundamentalist denominations and highest in the traditionally upper-status Reformation protestant churches—Presbyterian, Episcopal, Lutheran, and the like. They did, however, go to church more often than any other group.

Earlier, Martin Trow's work on support for McCarthy in Bennington was mentioned because of the similarity between the early Goldwater sup-

porters and Trow's McCarthy supporters in the overrepresentation of small-businessmen and self-employed persons in these two groups. Almost 30 percent of the early pro-Goldwater group was self-employed. About a quarter of the later supporters of the Senator were also self-employed, but only 17 percent of Johnson's backers showed this occupational attribute. Trow's analysis of the political divisions in Bennington led him to construct a four-fold typology of political outlook based on the attitudes of his respondents toward two of the major economic institutions of American society: big business and labor. Trow's four groups were "19th-Century Liberals" or persons holding unfavorable attitudes to *both* business and labor. It was in this group that his McCarthy supporters were overwhelmingly located. Secondly came "Right-Wing Conservatives" or persons holding negative attitudes toward labor and favorable opinions toward business. This group was followed by "Moderate Conservatives" or respondents with favorable attitudes towards both business and labor. Lastly were the "Labor Liberals," the obverse of the Right-Wing Conservatives, who liked labor unions but opposed big business.<sup>28</sup>

Table 17 reports the distribution of the candidate preference groups among these four categories of political orientation. The categories were prepared by selecting out persons responding to the feeling thermometer measures in the manner dictated by Trow's formulation. For example, "19th-Century Liberals" were designated by reason of the fact that they rated both business and labor 49° or lower on the feeling thermometer. As this table shows, however, 19th-century liberals, the group Trow found to be so dominantly pro-McCarthy, were not very strong among the supporters of Senator Goldwater. Only five percentage points separate the early pro-Goldwater group from the Johnson group on this measure. However, Trow's category "Right-Wing Conservative" has a good deal more discriminating power between all Goldwater's backers and those supporting Johnson. In this case, about 27 percentage points separate these groups from each other. Unfortunately, though, there was no substantial difference between the early and late pro-Goldwater groups on this measure, so it may only indicate a difference that we would normally expect to find between Republicans and Democrats.

Finally, of course, first Polsby and later Wolfinger have noted the importance of party identification in the composition of many of America's recent rightist and conservative movements. It may seem that a perfectly circular argument on this point would be the only one possible in this essay because of the dependence of the construction of the analytic groups on candidate preference and therefore, by extension, partisan identification. However, there is some rather convincing evidence that Republicanism (of

<sup>28</sup> Trow, "Right-Wing Radicalism."

TABLE 17  
Distribution of Candidate Preference Groups among Trow's Four Structural Categories of Political Orientation

	19TH-CENTURY LIBERALS		MODERATE CONSERVATIVES		RIGHT-WING CONSERVATIVES		LABOR LIBERALS		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Early supporters	9	13.2	27	39.7	30	44.1	2	2.9	68	100.0
Late supporters	12	9.3	54	41.9	56	43.4	7	5.4	129	100.0
Johnson supporters	37	8.2	267	58.9	76	16.8	73	16.1	453	100.0
Undecided voters										
and others	21	13.9	79	52.3	34	22.5	17	11.3	151	100.0
Total	79	9.9	427	53.3	196	24.5	99	12.4	801	100.0

### Conclusion

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an Independent variety) is an important and almost unique aspect of the early Goldwater group's make-up if the dimension of attitudinal consistency is added as a criterion for Right-Wing reference group membership.

In order to test this, all the respondents in the sample were isolated who rated The John Birch Society at 60° or higher on the SRC "Feeling Thermometer." This resulted in the isolation of 127 "pro-Birch" respondents. Of these, 43 or 33.4 percent were also early supporters of Senator Goldwater. The remaining 84 had other candidate preferences or lacked a presidential preference. These two groups were then compared on some other measures which appear to denote the level of attitudinal or perhaps ideological consistency among the two groups—their feelings toward liberals and labor unions. The results of this comparison were interesting: 74 percent and 61 percent of the early pro-Birch/pro-Goldwater group had negative attitudes ( $\leq 49^\circ$  on feeling thermometer measures) toward liberals and unions respectively. The proportion of negative responses among the other "pro-Birch" group was 28 percent negative toward liberals and 32 percent negative toward unions. Evidently there was much higher consistency among the pro-Goldwater segment of the pro-Birch respondents. It thus appears that the more consistent "rightists" did, indeed, support Goldwater more often than anyone else and as we have seen, these respondents are largely Republican (even though independent Republican) in their partisan identification.

And it is most certainly the case that the dominant partisan identification among both the early and late pro-Goldwater groups was Republican. In the case of the early group, of course, there are a greater proportion of Democrats and Independent Republicans than were present in the later group of his partisans, but nevertheless, to the great majority of persons in the American electorate who possess consistently conservative approaches to political matters, the Republican Party is their political home. No great wave of right-wing Democrats fell into Goldwater's camp even though the defection rate from the Democratic party in the South, a trend visible for many years, was larger in 1964 than usual.

The questions raised at the beginning of this study have, I hope, largely been answered. We have seen that "Goldwaterism" was hardly a mass movement in the sense of the sweeping abandonment of political norms and processes, and that in many respects its members are traditionally conservative both in their social and economic roles and in their political beliefs. Some evidence has been examined which suggests that at least the early pro-Goldwater group shows a reasonably clear-cut set of conservative political values—perhaps a conservative ideology. The liberal charges of "extremism" and "racism" directed at Goldwater's followers have been shown to have some foundations in fact; but, at the same time, these

tendencies among his supporters have been found to a somewhat lesser degree than many commentators seemed to believe in 1964.

What emerges from these data is a portrait of a small but active segment of Republican conservatives, people with strong opinions, money, middle-class status and education. They are, or were, committed more heavily than was any other group in 1964 to the election of their candidate. They did all they could, but as an ideological, elite minority their views had virtually no general appeal. That they captured the party at the national level attests to their dedication. If they still remain in control it will be due to their perseverance in the face of the fact that they represent minority opinion both within and without their party.

The Goldwater movement was, in its essentials, conservative. The data presented here strongly suggest that "radicalism," "extremism," "mass politics" and the other pejoratives of popular political sociology are rather inaccurate labels for Goldwater's supporters. Instead, in their social and demographic locations, their policy preferences and their attitudes about contemporary American society, Goldwater's supporters occupied traditionally conservative territory.

As a suggestion for future theory-builders of political extremism, I call attention to the vast discrepancies between the policy preferences and social attitudes that have emerged between the portion of the electorate who supported Goldwater's candidacy from the beginning and those who took some other course in 1964, whether Republican, Democratic, or those who avoided the election altogether.

The early pro-Goldwater group's values—if we may translate their strong beliefs and their commitment to political action as a value-oriented characteristic of their behavior—are grossly divergent from those of the larger society. In many respects they are "extremists" in the statistical sense of deviating strikingly from the society's "mean" on any number of policy variables. But it is evident from the data presented here that we are dealing not with a group of pure fanatics but with a well socialized set of political actors. These people not only mouth the Americanisms of citizen participation and political interest, they practice them as well. Their support of Senator Goldwater was a manifestation of that practice. These individuals are also reasonably well-educated and presumably sensitive to the drift of American society and American politics and have been so for a long time.

That this drift is distinctly to their displeasure seems evident: the welfare state, the rise of the bureaucratically oriented family, the increasing proportion of the economy controlled by large-scale organizations, and the beginnings of collapse of traditional status-deference patterns, such as those between Negroes and whites, are, if not directly opposed by these persons, the cause of much concern among them. It is certain that the direction of the society has resulted in political trends which are simply unacceptable to

them. In a sense, the society has moved past these people. They are victims of what I term *transitional unrepresentation*, a process which will, eventually, reduce their views to those of an historical anachronism.

In an earlier study I attempted to assess the size, growth rate, and contemporary importance of American rightist groups. In that study I concluded that despite somewhat fragmentary evidence there seemed to be an increasing mobilization of interest in rightist causes, possibly within a segment of the population that has traditionally held extremely conservative and rightist opinions, but which is now in the process of increasing its ideological solidarity and raising its levels of political interest, activity and involvement. Perhaps the nomination of Barry Goldwater may, very cautiously, be taken as further support for this view.<sup>29</sup>

Certainly, the behavior of the Republican party in its choice of candidates in 1964 was directed by ideological rather than politically rational considerations. Thus, while the Right as a political force may not have grown in size, it appears to have been successful in redirecting the course of one of America's major parties in a way that may have had long-term effects on voter alignment. If Goldwater's nomination is viewed as the triumph of the American Right within the framework of the legitimate political system, it was a triumph which has made even clearer the power that is available to an active, even though immensely unrepresentative, minority within the American political system. That this minority achieved success in its own terms cannot be doubted. Its goal was the articulation of a political ideal. The 27 million votes that were registered for Goldwater were seen by his supporters, however misguidedly, as an affirmation of the validity of that ideal at the mass level. The American Right therefore has achieved a victory which, unfortunately, may have been won at the expense of meaningful two-party politics.

<sup>29</sup> McEvoy, chap. I.

A political scientist examines the 1964 election and what it meant to the South. Bernard Cosman, *Five States for Goldwater: Continuity and Change in Southern Presidential Voting Patterns*, University of Alabama Press, 1966.

The "non-Deep" South, which includes Texas, revealed more continuity in voting patterns in 1964. His support in this region came more from urban and suburban areas. Race was not the deciding factor in the non-Deep South. However, where race was an issue, Goldwater did well.

Bernard Cosman, *Five States for Goldwater: Continuity and Change in Southern Presidential Voting Patterns*, University of Alabama Press, 1966.